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NOTES
United States v. Dickerson: A Case Study in Executive
Constitutional Interpretation
In United States v. Dickerson,' the Fourth Circuit held that a 1968
federal statute had overfurned Miranda v. Arizona,2 which created a
rule to protect a suspect's constitutional right against self-
incrimination? Miranda engendered a presumption that a confession
is coerced and, therefore, is inadmissible at a criminal trial under the
Fifth Amendment unless four warnings are given to the suspect
before interrogation.4 Members of Congress disagreed with the
Court's decision, however, and intended to overrule it by enacting 18
U.S.C. § 3501 in 1968.5 The statute instructs that any voluntary
confession shall be admissible.6 To determine if a confession is
voluntary, courts are to consider a number of factors, including
whether the Miranda warnings have been given.7 Notably, the statute
does not incorporate the presumption that a confession is involuntary
unless the warnings are given.8  Thus, the statute is facially
inconsistent with Miranda.' The Fourth Circuit held not only that
Miranda is not a constitutional mandate (the first federal appellate
court to so hold), but also that Congress, because it may pass statutes
overturning Supreme Court decisions that are not based on the
Constitution, had the authority to overturn Miranda and that it did so
1. 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 578 (1999).
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 691.
3. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-74.
4. Id These familiar warnings are: (1) that the suspect has a right to remain silent;
(2) that anything the suspect says can and will be used against him; (3) that the suspect has
the right to consult an attorney; and (4) that if the suspect cannot afford an attorney, the
court will appoint him one. See i& at 467-73. The Court noted that Congress and the
states could implement alternative measures to protect a suspect's right against
incrimination "so long as they are fully as effective ... in informing accused persons of
their right of silence and in affording a continuous opportunity to exercise it." Id. at 490.
5. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,
§ 701(a), 82 Stat. 197, 210-11 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3501, 3502
(1994)); see also 1 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 76, at 182-84 (3d ed. 1999) ("Congress ... sought to overturn Miranda by statute.").
6. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a).
7. See id § 3501(b).
8. See id
9. See 1 WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 76.
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by enacting § 3501.10
Aside from the ruling about the constitutional status of
Miranda," the Fourth Circuit's opinion raises a less publicized, but
more profound, issue. 2 In Dickerson, the Department of Justice
(DOJ or "Justice Department"), 3 which argued the case on appeal,
10. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 691.
11. The court's ruling on the status of Miranda caught the media's attention. See, e.g.,
Paul Butler, If the Court Is Right, Miranda Warnings May Disappear Nationwide, LEGAL
TIMES, Feb. 22, 1999, at 25; William Glaberson, After 33 Years of Controversy, Miranda
Ruling Faces Its Most Serious Challenge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1999, at A24; Carrie
Johnson, A Lonely Crusade: Paul Cassell's Long-Running Assault on Miranda Finally
Pays Off, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 15, 1999, at 8; Roger Parloff, Miranda on the Hot Seat, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 1999, § 6 (Magazine), at 84; David E. Rovella, 'Miranda' Upheaval
Unlikely, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 1, 1999, at Al.
Miranda's constitutional status is an issue worthy of debate and has been treated
extensively by scholars. See, e.g., 1 WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 76, at 180-87 (discussing the
controversy surrounding Miranda and collecting sources arguing from different
perspectives); Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1467-76
(1985) (arguing that the Supreme Court should reconsider the central issues in Miranda
and overrule the case); Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical
Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 387, 438 (1996) (stating that tentative calculations
indicate that Miranda caused almost four percent of criminal suspects to go free); Alfredo
Garcia, Is Miranda Dead, Was It Overruled, or Is It Irrelevant?, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
461, 461, 462 (1998) (discussing the "renewed academic debate" over Miranda and arguing
that Miranda is irrelevant because it has been overruled by Congress and eviscerated by
judicial opinion); Joseph D. Grano, Miranda v. Arizona and the Legal Mind Formalism's
Triumph over Substance and Reason, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 243, 246 (1986) (arguing "that
totally apart from its major constitutional flaws, Miranda represents a regretful triumph of
formalism over substance and reason"); Stephen J. Markman, Miranda v. Arizona: A
Historical Perspective, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 193, 193 (1986) (examining "the
development of the law of pre-trial interrogation prior to Miranda, some of the erroneous
factual and legal premises underlying Miranda, and developments in the law of pre-trial
interrogation after Miranda"); Irene Merker Rosenberg, Withrow v. Williams:
Reconstitutionalizing Miranda, 30 Hous. L. REV. 1685, 1686-90 (1993) (arguing that
although the Court appears at times to treat Miranda as a non-constitutional rule, the
Withrow Court suggested that the rule did stem from the Constitution); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social
Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 500, 547 (1996) (arguing that Miranda's substantial benefits
outweigh its insignificant costs to society); Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84
CORNELL L. REv. 109, 188 (1998) (arguing that Miranda represents a necessary
protection against self-incrimination, although the Court has characterized the rights as
prophylactic perhaps to justify "a more modest principle of exclusion").
12. See Ramsey Clark, Enduring Constitutional Issues, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1093, 1093
(1987) (predicting that there "would be anarchy" if the system embraces the wrong rule
regarding which government actors may interpret the Constitution authoritatively); David
A. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 CARDOzo L. REv. 113, 113
(1993) (stating that "[w]e tend to associate this question [of the executive branch's
autonomous interpretation of the Constitution] with a few great constitutional crises");
Ronald J. Ostrow, Meese's View That Court Doesn't Make Law Scored, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
24, 1986, § 1, at I (quoting Jesse H. Choper for the assertion that the argument raises "'a
profound question with eminent antecedents' ").
13. The Department of Justice is the executive branch agency that supervises federal
1154 [Vol. 78
EXECUTIVE INTERPRETATION
did not argue that Congress had overturned Miranda.14 Rather, the
DOJ has asserted its opinion that Miranda represents a constitutional
mandate and that the statute is therefore unconstitutional because it
is inconsistent with Miranda.15 Indeed, since 1968, the Justice
Department has refused to enforce the statute based on this view.16
Despite knowing the executive branch's opinion, the Fourth Circuit
reviewed the statute's constitutionality sua sponte.17 The court thus
refused to recognize the executive branch's authority to act on its own
interpretation of the Constitution.'
8
prosecutions.
14. Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 667.
15. See, e.g., Brief for the United States at *9, United States v. Dickerson, 2000 WL
141075 (No. 99-5525) ("Because the Miranda decision is of constitutional dimension,
Congress may not legislate a contrary rule unless this Court were to overrule Miranda.").
16. See generally CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, PRESIDENTIAL DEFIANCE OF
"UNCONSTITUTIONAL" LAWS: REVIVING THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE (1998) (discussing
the Executive's authority to refuse enforcement of statutes based on constitutional
concerns from historical and normative perspectives). One student writer has posited that
the DOJ may also refuse to enforce the statute because it believes that Miranda is an easy-
to-follow, bright-line rule that is preferable to the more ambiguous requirements of
§ 3501. See Eric. D. Miller, Comment, Should Courts Consider 18 U.S.C. § 3501 Sua
Sponte?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1029,1036 (1998).
There is debate over when the DOJ took its current position. Attorney General
Janet Reno made an official announcement in a 1997 letter to Congress that the DOJ
would not defend the constitutionality of § 3501. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 672. Even
before this announcement, however, the DOJ had never relied on the statute on appeal.
See Miller, supra, at 1029 (stating that the statute "has been virtually ignored in the thirty
years since its enactment"). For purposes of this Note's discussion of executive
interpretation of the Constitution, the dispute as to when the DOJ took its current
position is not important. This Note is concerned as a general matter with the
circumstances in which the executive branch may engage in legitimate autonomous
interpretation of the Constitution. A prior administration's view that a statute is
constitutional would not preclude the next administration from finding the same statute to
be objectionable.
17. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 682; Miller, supra note 16, at 1036.
18. This Note discusses the legitimacy of the executive branch's autonomous
constitutional interpretation. It is virtually undisputed that executive branch members
must interpret the Constitution to some degree in order to carry out their duties. See infra
notes 60-61 and accompanying text. In discussing whether executive interpretation or
autonomous interpretive authority is legitimate, this Note does not address those instances
in which executive branch members engage in the generally accepted practices of
interpretation. Instead, unless otherwise noted, these phrases refer to situations in which
executive officials interpret the Constitution with more expansive autonomy than is
universally approved. These situations usually arise when executive branch members
disagree with either the judiciary's or the legislature's interpretation and choose to act on
their own constitutional interpretation. See infra notes 66-85.
This Note's discussion of executive interpretation of the Constitution in the
context of Dickerson consciously conflates the issue of constitutional interpretation with
prosecutorial discretion. Prosecutorial discretion describes "the wide range of alternatives
available to a prosecutor in criminal cases, including the decision to prosecute, the
2000] 1155
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The power to interpret the Constitution authoritatively
represents the power to define the substance and scope of all other
constitutional powers and individual rights.19 As the Bishop of
Bangor told the King of England in the eighteenth century,
"'[w]hoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or
spoken laws, it is he who is truly the lawgiver, to all intents and
purposes, and not the person who first wrote or spoke them.' "20 This
Note considers whether the Fourth Circuit should have recognized
the executive power to autonomously interpret the Constitution and
thus restricted its opinion in Dickerson to the issues presented by the
government and defendant in the case.
This Note first reviews the facts of Dickerson and the Fourth
Circuit's decision to review the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3501
sua sponte, notwithstanding the DOJ's refusal to invoke the statute.21
The Note then reviews the scholarly debate and background law
regarding the executive branch's authority to autonomously interpret
the Constitution.' Finally, the Note analyzes the court's decision in
Dickerson as it relates to executive interpretive autonomy.23
Turning to the facts of the case, police took Charles T. Dickerson
into custody in connection with a bank robbery.2 4 He first denied, but
particular charges to be brought, plus bargaining, mode of trial conduct, and
recommendations for sentencing, parole, etc." STEVEN H. GIms, LAW DICTIONARY 147
(Barron's Educational Series, 4th ed. 1996). Professors LaFave and Israel posit at least
three reasons why prosecutors possess this discretion, including "legislative
'overcriminalization,' "limited law-enforcement resources, and the "need to individualize
justice." WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 13.2(a)(1)-(3) (1992). The judiciary can and does oversee the use of such discretion in
some types of cases. See id. § 13.3(c). Sometimes, however, the DOJ exercises its
discretion not to prosecute because it believes that an applicable statute is
unconstitutional. This raises an issue about the circumstances in which the executive
branch may legitimately interpret the constitution independently of the courts. Thus, this
Note discusses the courts' treatment of a special category of prosecutorial discretion as
raised by Dickerson; that category is the manifestation of executive branch members'
belief that a federal criminal procedure statute is unconstitutional.
19. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to
Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217,220 (1994).
20. GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 130 (1981) (quoting
Benjamin Hoadley, Bishop of Bangor, Sermon Preached Before the King of England
(Mar. 31,1777)).
21. See infra notes 24-58 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 59-180 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 181-279 and accompanying text.
24. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 673. Bank robbery is a federal crime. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(a), (d) (1994). Dickerson was indicted for conspiracy to commit bank robbery
under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994), bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d), and using a
firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994).
See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 671.
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later admitted, his involvement in the robbery.25 At trial, Dickerson
made a motion to suppress his confession, contending that the police
did not advise him of his Miranda rights until after he confessed.2 6 At
the suppression hearing, an officer testified that he took Dickerson's
confession after reading him the Miranda warningY The U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ruled in favor of
Dickerson, finding as a matter of fact that Dickerson gave his
statement before being advised of his rights.28 The prosecution
moved for the court to reconsider its ruling on the suppression of
Dickerson's confession, arguing that the confession was admissible
either under Miranda or, alternatively, under § 3501.29 The district
court did not address the Justice Department's § 3501 argument and
rejected the Miranda argument on procedural grounds. ° Upon this
ruling, the Justice Department filed an interlocutory appeal to the
Fourth Circuit.?'
The defendant's brief on appeal argued solely that Dickerson's
confession was not admissible under Miranda.3 2 Although the
prosecution had argued in district court for the admissibility of the
confession under § 3501, on appeal the DOJ argued only that
Dickerson's confession was admissible under Miranda.3 3 As the court
of appeals noted, the failure to raise the § 3501 issue was no mere
oversight on the government's part, but rather was consistent with a
thirty-year Justice Department policy of not invoking the statute
because of doubts about its constitutionality? 4
The Fourth Circuit majority, in an opinion written by Judge
Williams, reversed the trial court's ruling and held that Dickerson's
confession was admissible. Judge Williams did not limit her opinion
to the parties' arguments about the admissibility of Dickerson's
25. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 673-74.
26. See id. at 674-75.
27. See id. at 675.
28. See id. at 675-76. Despite finding in Dickerson's favor, the district court denied
his motion to suppress evidence found as a result of his confession because it found that
his statement had been voluntary under the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 676.
29. See id. at 676-77.
30. See United States v. Dickerson, 971 F. Supp. 1023,1024-25 (E.D. Va. 1997).
31. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 676-77.
32. See id. at 695 (Michael, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) ("[T]he
majority holds that the section is constitutional, without the benefit of any briefing in
opposition.").
33. See id. at 680.
34. See id. at 680-81; supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text (discussing the DOJ's
position on the constitutional status of Miranda).
35. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 695.
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confession under Miranda.6 Rather, she noted that the judiciary is
not generally obligated to limit its legal analysis to the arguments
presented by the parties to the case.37 The court instead accepted and
considered an amicus brief that took the position that Miranda is not
a constitutional mandate and that § 3501 should define the standard
for admissibility of confessions. 8
After discussing the facts of the case, Judge Williams
distinguished Dickerson from Davis v. United States,3 9 a 1994 Supreme
Court case in which the Court expressly chose not to review the
constitutionality of § 3501.40 In Davis, the Supreme Court declined to
review the constitutionality of the provision because that issue was a
question of "first impression involving the interpretation of a federal
statute on which the Department of Justice expressly declined to take
a position."'41 The Fourth Circuit concluded that, unlike the Court in
Davis, it could not avoid deciding Dickerson on constitutional
grounds42 because the Justice Department had taken a position on
§ 3501 after Davis by officially notifying Congress of its opinion that
the statute was unconstitutional.43 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit
36. See id. at 680-83 (stating the court's reasons for addressing the constitutionality of
§ 3501).
37. See id at 682. Moreover, the court noted that while the Supreme Court's role is
one of review, the federal circuit courts have discretion in deciding the questions to be
resolved on appeal. See id. at 683. But see Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 464 (1994)
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("[T]he refusal to consider arguments not raised [by the parties] is
a sound prudential practice ... ."); Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(Scalia, J.) ("The premise of our adversarial system is that appellate courts do not sit as
self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal
questions presented and argued by the parties before them.").
38. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 680 n.14. The Washington Legal Foundation and the
Safe Streets Coalition submitted the amicus brief. See id.; Brief of the Washington Legal
Foundation and Safe Streets Coalition as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant United
States at 1, Dickerson v. United States, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999) (No. 97-4750),
available in <http:lwww.law.utah.edulfacultylbios/cassell> (visited Mar. 31, 2000). At
argument, the court granted five minutes to University of Utah Professor of Law Paul G.
Cassell, an ardent critic of Miranda, to support this brief. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 680-
83; see also Johnson, supra note 11, at 8 (discussing Cassell as a critic of Miranda). Federal
court reliance on such a brief is not unusual. See generally Karen O'Connor & Lee
Epstein, Court Rules and Workload: A Case Study of Rules Governing Amicus Curiae
Participation, 8 JUST. SYS. J. 35, 35 (1983) (suggesting that amicus briefs are often useful
to Supreme Court Justices in forming their opinions). What is unusual, however, is the
consideration of authority brought up only by the amicus brief. See supra note 37 and
accompanying text (discussing the judiciary's prudential practice of considering only those
questions raised by the parties).
39. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
40. See id at 457 n.*.
41. Id.
42. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 683.
43. See id. at 672, 683.
1158 [Vol. 78
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determined that the Davis Court's reasons for not reviewing § 3501's
constitutionality no longer existed.4
Having reached the conclusion that review of § 3501's
constitutionality was appropriate, the court considered whether
Congress had the authority to overturn Miranda by legislation.4 The
court noted that if Miranda is not constitutionally mandated, then
Congress would have the authority to enact legislation contradicting
the holding in Miranda.46 If, on the other hand, Miranda is mandated
by the Constitution, contrary legislation would be invalid.47 After
evaluating Miranda and its progeny, the court ruled that Miranda is
not constitutionally mandated, but is instead a prophylactic rule
granting defendants broader protection than the Constitution itself
requires.48  Accordingly, the court held that Congress has the
authority to overrule Miranda and did so by validly enacting § 3501.49
The court then concluded that Dickerson's confession, although
obtained in violation of Miranda, was voluntary and therefore
44. See id, at 683. This reasoning is suspect. The Supreme Court may have used the
word "position" in Davis to mean a position in favor of § 3501's constitutionality. See text
accompanying note 41. Indeed, as the dissent in Dickerson pointed out, the DOJ's
declaration of its opinion on the constitutionality of § 3501 "simply confirms what the
Supreme Court already knew in Davis, that is, that [the DOJ] was not going to invoke the
statute to try to salvage confessions." Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 696 (Michael, J., dissenting in
part and concurring in part). As a final justification for reviewing § 3501's
constitutionality, the Fourth Circuit stated that the issue would otherwise remain
unresolved because of the DOJ's refusal to argue for the admissibility of evidence under
the statute. See id. at 683. This reasoning strongly implies that the judges were under the
impression that § 3501 should be enforced. There is some doubt that enforcement would
have benefits, however, as there has been extended debate about Miranda's normative
effects. Compare Cassell, supra note 11, at 390-91 (arguing that Miranda has had a
substantial negative effect on national law enforcement efforts and should be abolished),
with Schulhofer, supra note 11, at 502-03 (arguing that Miranda is a rule with substantial
benefits and without significant detriments to law enforcement efforts). One's view of
Miranda may well depend on one's political beliefs. See Glaberson, supra note 11, at A24
("[T"he reactions to [Dickerson] were shaped by political perspective. Conservatives
generally applauded it as an overdue limitation on what some saw as excesses in favor of
defendants."). The Fourth Circuit's conservative bent, see Neil A. Lewis, A Court
Becomes a Model of Conservative Pursuits, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1999, at Al, may explain
why the court was loath to leave § 3501 unenforced.
45. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 687-92.
46. See id. at 688 (citing Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 353 n.11 (1959)
(upholding legislation that was at odds with a previous Court decision that had not been
based on constitutional grounds)).
47. See id. at 688 (citing City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding
that Congress does not have the authority to overrule a Supreme Court decision
interpreting the Constitution)).
48. See id. at 690-91.
49. See id. at 691.
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admissible under § 3501.50
Judge Michael dissented from the court's decision to consider
§ 3501's constitutionality5  He reasoned that the situation in
Dickerson was very similar to the one the Supreme Court confronted
in Davis52 and that the majority should have followed the Supreme
Court's lead in not reviewing § 3501's constitutionality.5 3 The dissent
acknowledged that the Justice Department had made a statement on
§ 3501's constitutionality since Davis, but did not find that statement
to be significant.54 The DOJ's statement only reiterated a fact of
which Congress and the judiciary were already aware-that the DOJ
would not defend the constitutionality of the provision.55
The dissent also disagreed with the majority's conclusion that if a
circuit court did not review the constitutionality of § 3501, then
nobody would. 6 In fact, Judge Michael argued, the judiciary is ill-
prepared to decide how laws are to be enforced 7 Congress, on the
50. See id. at 692-93. Under § 3501, a confession is admissible in court if made
voluntarily. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1994). The court noted that the district court found the
evidence obtained as a result of Dickerson's confession to be admissible under United
States v. Elie, 111 F.3d 1135 (4th Cir. 1997). See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 692-93. Evidence
of a confession obtained in violation of Miranda is admissible under Elie only if the
confession itself was voluntary within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Elie, 111
F.3d at 1142-43; see also Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 693 (summarizing Elie's holding). Thus,
the district court could have found the evidence obtained as a result of Dickerson's
confession to be admissible if, and only if, the district court found Dickerson's confession
to be voluntary. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 693. This finding of voluntariness has been
criticized by at least one commentator. See Brooke B. Grona, Casenote, United States v.
Dickerson, Leaving Miranda and Finding a Deserted Statute, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 367, 379
(1999) (noting the Fourth Circuit's extensive discussion of Miranda's history and its failure
to apply § 3501 upon finding the statute applicable).
51. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 695 (Michael, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part). Judge Michael dissented from the majority's decision to review the constitutionality
of § 3501 because of the DOJ's refusal to argue that Dickerson's confession was admissible
under the provision. See icL (Michael, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). He
concurred with the portion of the majority's opinion concerning the validity of a search
warrant executed by police in the apprehension of Dickerson. See id. (Michael, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part).
52. See id. at 696 (Michael, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
53. See id. (Michael, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
54. See id (Michael, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
55. See id. (Michael, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (citing Davis v.
United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 n.*). Judge Michael also contended that the Fourth
Circuit should not have interfered with the executive branch's discretion in deciding how
to prosecute a criminal case. See id. at 696-97 (Michael, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part). Finally, Judge Michael argued that the court should limit its review to
the issues argued by the parties to the case. See id. at 697 (Michael, J., dissenting in part
and concurring in part).
56. See id. at 697 (Michael, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
57. See id. (Michael, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
1160 [Vol. 78
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other hand, is equipped to investigate Miranda's effects and can use
public hearings to question the DOJ's prosecution and litigation
strategies. 8
Politicians and commentators have debated for centuries the
question of who has the authority to interpret the Constitution, but
that debate has grown more intense in recent years.59 Proponents of
executive interpretation point out that the executive branch must
interpret the Constitution in order to do its job.' For example, when
a federal law enforcement officer makes an arrest, she often must
determine whether probable cause exists, which is a constitutional
question.6 In other circumstances, however, the President and other
executive officials have claimed a much broader power to act-or
refuse to act-upon their own interpretation of the Constitution, even
when that interpretation is inconsistent with the judiciary's
interpretation. 62 These situations include pardons of individuals,
vetoes of legislation, nonacquiescence with court opinions,63
nonenforcement of federal statutes, and refusals to carry out specific
judicial orders.64
Executive exercise of the pardon and veto powers on
constitutional grounds is widely accepted as legitimate. 5
58. See id. at 697-98 (Michael, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
59. See Bruce G. Peabody, Nonjudicial Constitutional Interpretation, Authoritative
Settlement, and a New Agenda for Research, 16 CONST. COMMENTARY 63, 63 (1999)
(describing the "lively debate [which] has been percolating" during the last decade).
60. See, e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, Executive Autonomy, Judicial Authority and the Rule
of Law: Reflections on Constitutional Interpretation and the Separation of Powers, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 137, 138 (1993) (stating that "practice, tradition, and institutional
constraints" have created widespread acceptance of at least some forms of executive
interpretive authority). Professor Strauss asserts that the executive branch almost
certainly engages in interpretation more often than the judiciary. See Strauss, supra note
12, at 114.
61. See Strauss, supra note 12, at 114.
62. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 905,
906-07 (1989-1990) (referring to a "long history of presidential action on the basis of
constitutional views, sometimes views at variance with those of the courts").
63. Nonacquiescence is the executive practice of the acceptance of judicial orders as
they relate to the parties in a specific circuit, accompanied by a refusal to change the
general policy or administration of a law contrary to the judiciary's interpretation. See
Dan T. Coenen, The Constitutional Case Against Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 75 MINN.
L. REV. 1339, 1341-42 (1991).
64. See Easterbrook, supra note 62, at 907-08 (discussing presidential pardons and
vetoes); id. at 913-14 (discussing nonacquiescence); id. at 914-24 (discussing the
nonexecution of statutes); id. at 926 (discussing the nonexecution of judicial judgments).
65. See id. at 906-07 ("There is a long history of presidential action on the basis of
constitutional views, sometimes views at variance with those of the courts. Four categories
[including pardons and vetoes] are unproblematic .... "); Paulsen, supra note 19, at 264
("Pardons and vetoes seem to be the least controversial occasions for the exercise of
2000] 1161
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Commentators have concluded that the Framers granted these
powers to create an area in which the President is authorized to
interpret the Constitution independently.6  In contrast to the
consensus of opinion regarding the veto and pardon powers, however,
scholars continue to debate the legitimacy of executive
nonacquiescence. One famous example of nonacquiescence is
President Lincoln's response to the Supreme Court's infamous
decision in Scott v. Sandford ("Dred Scott").6 Lincoln's
administration granted patents and visas to African-Americans as
citizens in clear nonacquiescence to the Court's holding in Dred Scott
that they were not United States citizens. 9 Some scholars assert that
nonacquiescence is a valid exercise of the executive branch's
interpretive authority,70  while other commentators7  and many
courts"' condemn the practice.
Since the time of Lincoln, Presidents increasingly have refused to
executive review."); Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, the Supreme Law of the Land,
and Attorney General Meese: A Comment, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1017, 1019 (1987) (observing
that the exercise of the executive pardon and veto power on constitutional grounds "are
usually seen as entirely unproblematic").
66. See MAY, supra note 16, at 22 ("If a president believes that such a law is
unconstitutional, he may pardon those who have violated the measure."). Some
commentators have argued that the Framers provided these powers as an alternative to
granting executive interpretive autonomy in other areas. See id. at 38-41 (arguing that the
presidential veto and pardon powers were the Framers' alternatives to broader power to
defy statutes that the Executive believes to be unconstitutional).
67. See Coenen, supra note 63, at 1345 (describing the "lively exchange of views in the
legal literature" regarding this area of the law).
68. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
69. See Paul L. Colby, Two Views on the Legitimacy of Nonacquiescence in Judicial
Opinions, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1041, 1053 (1987) (describing Lincoln's response of
nonacquiescence to Dred Scott).
70. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 62, at 913-14 (arguing that nonacquiescence is a
legitimate practice of the executive branch's power); Samuel Estreicher & Richard L.
Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 751-53
(1989) (offering a limited defense of nonacquiescence); Paulsen, supra note 19, at 272-76
(arguing that nonacquiescence is legitimate).
71. See, e.g., Coenen, supra note 63, at 1444 (arguing that nonacquiescence violates
the separation of powers); Matthew Diller & Nancy Morawetz, Intracircuit
Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of Law: A Response to Estreicher and
Revesz, 99 YALE L.J. 801, 803 (1990) (arguing that the nonacquiescence standard
discussed by Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 70, would upset the balance of power
between courts and administrative agencies); Joshua I. Schwartz, Nonacquiescence,
Crowell v. Benson, and Administrative Adjudication, 77 GEO. L.J. 1815, 1820 (1989)
(arguing that nonacquiescence should be restricted to a small number of cases).
72. William Wade Buzbee, Note, Administrative Agency Intracircuit Nonacquiescence,
85 COLUM. L. REv. 582, 582 (1985). Buzbee reports that nonacquiescence "has been
condemned by virtually all courts" involved in litigation over the Social Security
Administration's refusal to follow circuit court precedent in the 1980s. For more details
on the controversy, see supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
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enforce federal statutes that they interpret to be unconstitutional.7 3
Nonenforcement, like nonacquiescence, is a divisive issue among
commentators. 74 A study of the practice shows that since the
Constitution's ratification, there have been at least twenty cases of
nonenforcement.7 5  Some notable examples include President
Jefferson's refusal to enforce the Sedition Act of 179876 and the
refusal by all Executives to enforce the 1973 War Powers Resolution
since its enactment.77 Some scholars argue that nonenforcement is a
fundamental part of a coordinate system of government that prefers
inefficiency to tyranny.78 According to this theory, if the executive
branch has the authority to refuse to enforce an unconstitutional
statute, then the likelihood is reduced that an unconstitutional law
will go into effect, thereby enhancing protection of the people's
rights.79  Critics of the practice respond by analogizing
nonenforcement to a line-item veto, ° which the Supreme Court has
73. See generally MAY, supra note 16, at 128-29, tbl.9.1 (discussing a study of the
executive branch's practice of defying unconstitutional laws). Professor May concludes
that "there has been a dramatic rise" in the nonexecution of statutes. Id. at 135.
74. Commentators argue for and against the legitimacy of nonenforcement.
Interestingly, both groups claim there is a consensus supporting the other side of the issue.
Professors Alexander and Schauer, for example, argue for executive compliance with the
Supreme Court's decisions, although "a consensus has developed among scholars and
officials ... that nonjudicial officials need not treat Supreme Court opinions as
authoritative in order to comply with their obligation to the Constitution." Larry
Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1359 (1997). Professor Merrill, on the other hand, argues that the
Court's decisions need not be taken as binding, but states that "many commentators (and
most judges) presuppose the opposite view: that judicial understandings of law are
directly binding on executive actors." Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding
Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDozo L. REV. 43,50 (1993).
75. See MAY, supra note 16, at 127-29 & tbl.9.1.
76. Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 73, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired); see JAMES MORTON
SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES 305 (1956). President Jefferson's inaction is not included in Professor May's
study. See MAY, supra note 16, at 127-29 & tbl.9.1; J. Randy Beck, Presidential Defiance
of "Unconstitutional" Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 16 CONST. COMMENTARY
419, 429-30 (1999) (book review of MAY, supra note 16). Professor Beck uses this
absence to support the argument that May took a minimalist view of what counts as
executive defiance. See Beck, supra, at 430.
77. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50
U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1994)); see also John 0. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the
Executive in Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the
Separation of Powers, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1993, at 293, 315-22
(describing and tracing the history of the War of Powers Resolution).
78. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 62, at 929; Paulsen, supra note 19, at 269-70; see
also infra notes 101-17 and accompanying text (describing the Framers' intent regarding
coordinacy and how their intent may support executive interpretation).
79. For a hypothetical illustration, see Easterbrook, supra note 62, at 922-24.
80. See J. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Four Faces of the Line Item Veto: A
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held to be an unconstitutional executive action even though explicitly
authorized by Congress."' Much like the line-item veto, these
commentators argue, nonenforcement permits the President to sign a
bill and then effectively to veto the portions of it that he finds
undesirable by raising constitutional objections to those portions. 2
A final form of executive interpretation is nonenforcement of
judgments. The President may refuse to enforce a specific order of
the Supreme Court if he thinks the order is unconstitutional, but this
scenario has happened only a few times in our nation's history. In
one such instance, President Lincoln refused to release a prisoner
during the Civil War despite an order from the Supreme Court to do
soP3 Scholarly support for nonenforcement is sparse. The accepted
argument against the nonenforcement of judgments is that such a
practice overrides one of the primary checks on executive power. 4 If
the judiciary's authority to render binding judgments was eliminated,
an important check on executive power would be eliminated as well.83
Beyond the examples explored above, scholars also have debated
the general legitimacy of autonomous executive constitutional
interpretations. As with most areas of constitutional theory, the
arguments about autonomous executive interpretation concentrate on
the text of the Constitution, the intent of the Framers, the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, and the normative consequences
of executive interpretation. When making textual arguments about
executive interpretive autonomy, commentators often look to the
Executive 6 and Judicials7 Oath Clauses. The Executive Oath Clause
charges the President with the duty to "preserve, protect and defend"
the Constitution.88 The Judicial Oath Clause calls on federal judges
to take an oath to "support" the Constitution.8 9 Of course, the
Reply to Tribe and Kurland, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 437,452-57 (1990).
81. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417,438 (1998).
82. See Sidak & Smith, supra note 80, at 452-57.
83. See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148-49 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487);
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous
Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 81, 89-99 (1993).
84. See, e.g., Rosenfeld, supra note 60, at 143-44.
85. See Merrill, supra note 74, at 71 (noting that nonenforcement of judgments
"would clearly represent a radical transformation in the current balance of power among
the branches--one that most observers would find alarming because it would eliminate the
major check on abuses of executive power").
86. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
87. Id. art. VI.
88. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
89. Id. art. VI (commanding that all legislative, executive, and judicial officers "shall
be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution").
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commands of the Constitution in a particular situation are often
unclear and require interpretation.90 The question, then, is whether
the President can interpret the Constitution as she carries out her
oath or whether she must look solely to the judiciary's
interpretation.9' At least one commentator has compared the two
oaths, concluding that the executive oath imposes greater duties and
therefore should carry with it interpretive power at least equal to that
of the judiciary.9
Some supporters of binding judicial interpretation disagree with
such an argument and instead posit that the Executive Oath Clause
supports a narrow view of executive interpretive autonomy.93 They
argue that the Constitution is an imperfect document, and the
executive branch's obligation to uphold another branch's imperfect
interpretation of the Constitution is only a small step from upholding
the imperfect Constitution itself.94 Additionally, they point out that
many government officials take an oath to support the Constitution,
but that it would be unworkable for all such officials to interpret the
Constitution independently.95 For example, if lower federal courts
engaged in independent constitutional interpretation, they would be
ignoring both the doctrine of stare decisis and the opinion of higher
courts. 6
Both proponents and critics of executive interpretation also cite
the Take Care Clause of Article II to support their arguments.97
Proponents argue that the foremost requirement of the Clause is the
proper execution of the "supreme law of the land"-the
Constitution.98 Critics argue that the President is obliged to take care
90. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLICS 3 (2d ed. 1986) ("A statute's repugnancy to
the Constitution is in most instances not self-evident; it is, rather, an issue of policy that
someone must decide.").
91. See Strauss, supra note 12, at 121-22.
92. See Paulsen, supra note 19, at 260-61.
93. See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 74, at 1379-80.
94. See id (arguing that governmental officials take an oath to support an "imperfect
Constitution" and that it is only a small, and appropriate, step to follow imperfect judicial
interpretations of the Constitution).
95. See Merrill, supra note 74, at 74.
96. See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 74, at 1381 n.90.
97. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (instructing that the President "shall take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed").
98. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803). Further, proponents note
that an unconstitutional statute is not a law, according to the Court. See Norton v. Shelby
County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1885) ("An unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no
rights; it imposes no duties.").
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that all duly enacted laws be executed.99 At least one scholar has
looked to history and asserted that the Take Care Clause was meant
to restrict the President's power rather than to grant carte blanche to
implement his vision of constitutional law.100
Commentators have concentrated most of their attention on the
intent of the Framers and the structure of the government that they
intended to create. Some commentators invoke the Framers' concept
of "coordinacy" to argue for the legitimacy of executive
interpretation. 1 1  The notion of coordinacy derives from The
Federalist No. 49, which states that "[t]he several departments being
perfectly coordinate by the terms of their common commission,
neither of them ... can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of
settling the boundaries between their respective powers."1
Proponents note that the Framers created not only independence by
separating powers among the branches, but also interdependence.0 3
In order to avoid the tyranny that might result from the accumulation
of too much power in the hands of one branch, the Framers
envisioned a system in which the branches were "so far connected
and blended, as to give to each a constitutional control over the
others."' 4 Thus, no branch has "directly or indirectly, an overruling
influence over the others in the administration of their respective
powers." 0 5 Instead, the Framers gave each branch the means by
which to avoid encroachment by the others'01: each department that
99. See, e.g., MAY, supra note 16, at 16-18 (discussing the assertion that the Take
Care Clause should be viewed as support for the notion that Presidents are not authorized
to defy a statute they consider to be unconstitutional); Eugene Gressman, Take Care, Mr.
President, 64 N.C. L. REv. 381, 381 (1986) (asserting that the Reagan administration's
refusal to enforce the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 violated the Take Care
Clause and "cannot and must not be tolerated").
100. See MAY, supra note 16, at 16-18.
101. Professor Paulsen, for example, develops what he calls the "postulate of
coordinacy" at great length. Paulsen, supra note 19, at 228-40; see also Merrill, supra note
74, at 121-27 (discussing the coordinacy argument and concluding that it should lead to a
recognition of some degree of executive interpretive autonomy).
102. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 257, 257 (James Madison) (Max Beloff ed., 2d ed.
1987). Coordinacy does not mean that the branches have an equal scope of power, but
rather that they have equal power in the spheres in which more than one branch acts. See
Paulsen, supra note 19, at 228. This notion is supported by The Federalist No. 49, which
refers to stronger and weaker branches and ways in which the latter may resist
encroachments by the former. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, supra, at 257.
103. See Rosenfeld, supra note 60, at 137 & n.1.
104. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 252 (James Madison) (Max Beloff ed., 2d ed. 1987).
105. Id.
106. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 265 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison)
(Max Beloff ed., 2d ed. 1987) (stating that the security against the inordinate
concentration of powers "consists of giving to those who administer each department, the
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was affected by another department's actions was given the power to
review those actions.1 7 James Wilson illustrated this concept by
stating that if the legislature passed an unconstitutional statute, the
court could invalidate the act. 08 Wilson also noted that "[iun the
same manner the President could shield himself and refuse to carry
into effect an act that violates the constitution."'1 9
The Framers made similar comments in speaking of the proper
separation of powers. Alexander Hamilton implied that the judiciary
had the exclusive power to interpret the Constitution when he stated
that "[t]he interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar
province of the courts,"" 0 but many other Framers disagreed.
Thomas Jefferson, for example, argued that identifying judges as "the
ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions" is "a very dangerous
doctrine indeed, and one which would place us under the despotism
of an oligarchy.""' He also observed that "nothing in the
Constitution has given [to the judges] a right to decide for the
Executive, more than to the Executive to decide for them.' ' 12 In
addition, James Madison posited that "each [branch] must, in the
exercise of its functions, be guided by the text of the Constitution
according to its own interpretation of it.' 3
In addition to establishing the President's interpretive autonomy,
the Framers also expressed concern with an overly powerful
judiciary." 4  To prevent that fear from becoming a reality, the
necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the
others").
107. See James Wilson, Of Government, Lectures on Law Before the College of
Philadelphia (1790-1791), in 1 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 284, 299 (Robert Green
McCloskey ed., Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 1967) (1804) ("[T]he proceedings
of each, when they come forth into action and are ready to affect the whole, are liable to
be examined and controlled by one or both of the others.").
108. See PENNSYLVANiA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1787-1788, at 305 (John
B. McMaster & Frederick D. Stone eds., De Capo Press 1970) (1888) (statement of James
Wilson).
109. Id. Wilson made other statements strongly supporting the idea of coordinacy.
See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 107, at 300 (stating that "[e]ach part acts and is acted upon,
supports and is supported, regulates and is regulated by the rest").
110. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 398 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 2d ed.
1987).
111. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), in 15
WRITINGS OFTHOMAS JEFFERSON 276, 277 (Albert E. Bergh ed., 1904).
112. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mrs. John Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in 11
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 111, at 49,50.
113. James Madison, Unaddressed Letter of 1834, in 4 LETrERS AND OTHER
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 349,349 (New York, R. Worthington 1884).
114. See Paulsen, supra note 19, at 245-46 Paulsen notes that Brutus, the Anti-
Federalist counterpart to Publius, dated his Essay No. XI on January 31, 1788. See id. at
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Framers provided that the judiciary had no force by which to usurp
power, but rather had "merely [the power] of judgment.""' 5 Thomas
Jefferson indicated that if the courts' power was not limited in this
way-that is, if the judiciary could prescribe rules governing the other
branches-then the Constitution would be "a mere thing of wax in
the hands of the judiciary, which they may twist and shape into any
form they please.""' 6 The separation of powers embodied in the
Constitution stems in part from this fear of an overreaching judiciary,
and consequently, the judicial branch must depend on the executive
branch to carry out its judgments." 7
One modern critic of executive interpretation finds support for
his position by looking to the intent of the Framers. He notes that the
"royal prerogative"-a power held by the British monarchy that was
analogous to executive nonexecution of a statute-caused significant
political problems in seventeenth-century Britain."8 The Framers
were aware that the "royal prerogative" created problems, and critics
of autonomous executive interpretation argue that the Framers
purposefully chose not to create an equivalent power under the
Constitution." 9
Such critics' assertions are supported by the fact that the
Constitution provides for qualified veto and pardon powers instead of
245 n.94; Essays of Brutus, No. XI, reprinted in 2 HERBERT J. STORING, THE COMPLETE
AetI-FEDERALIST §§ 2.9.130-.144 (1981). That Essay criticized the proposed
Constitution for creating an overly powerful judiciary. See Essays of Brutus, No. XI,
supra. The Federalist No. 78 minimizes the power of the judiciary in response to Brutus's
arguments. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 110, passim; Paulsen, supra note 19,
at 245.
115. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 110, at 396.
116. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), in 15 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 111, at 276,277.
117. See id. Because the judiciary has no independent force, it has been called the
"least dangerous branch." Id Alexander Bickel's book title, The Least Dangerous
Branch. The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics, captures this sentiment as well.
BICKEL, supra note 90.
118. See MAY, supra note 16, at 3-8. Parliament abolished the prerogative in 1689
after years of frustration with this power, which put the Crown above the law. See id. at 5.
For example, when Parliament negotiated for the Crown to pass a statute, the Crown
would receive its side of the bargain (usually revenue) and thereafter dispense with or
suspend the law using its prerogative. See id. at 4. The prerogative was also used to
exempt from taxes particular individuals who were in the Crown's favor. See id. at 5. In
short, the Crown, through the royal prerogative, could "abrogate laws that the Crown
opposed or to confer special privileges on royal favorites and those able to purchase
dispensations." Id.
119. See, e.g., id, at 11 (stating that the Constitution's text and the debates surrounding
ratification demonstrate the Framers' rejection of a presidential prerogative).
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an unqualified presidential prerogative. 120  In addition, some
statements made by the Framers lend support to the argument that
they did not intend for expansive executive interpretation to exist.
For example, after positing that a law in conflict with the Constitution
is void, Alexander Hamilton asserted that there is "no other way than
through the medium of the courts of justice" to determine a statute's
constitutionality.'2' Similarly, in urging President George Washington
to veto a bill, Thomas Jefferson advised him that the presidential veto
is "the shield provided by the Constitution to protect against the
invasions of the legislature."''  Arguably, this statement implies that
the veto is the only form of independent constitutional interpretation
available to the Executive."z Finally, James Madison argued "that
the Executive of the U. States, is ... unauthorized to prevent the
execution of a Decree sanctioned by the Supreme Court." 24 This
statement implies that Madison believed that nonexecution of a
judicial order is unconstitutional.
The judiciary's historical treatment of constitutional
interpretation sheds more light on whether the executive branch may
autonomously interpret the Constitution. In Marbury v. Madison,'2s
Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that because the United States has a
federal government with limited powers, it follows that laws that do
not conform to the paramount law of the Constitution are void. 26
Chief Justice Marshall noted, however, that the legislature should not
be the branch that decides whether a statute is unconstitutional;
letting the lawmaker make that determination would amount to an
"invitation to consistent abuse." 27 Marbury declared that "[i]t is
120. See, e.g., id. at 11-15, 21-23. Additionally, Professor May posits that if the
Constitution gave the President broad powers of interpretation, there would have been
strong pressure to forbid the Executive from suspending the Bill of Rights. See icL at 37.
The fact that there was no such pressure indicates that neither the Framers nor the Anti-
Federalists believed that the Constitution gave the Executive interpretive powers. See id.
121. THE FEDERALISTNO. 78, supra note 110, at 397.
122. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion Against the Constitutionality of a National Bank
(Feb. 15, 1791), in 3 THE WRrrINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 111, at 152
(emphasis added).
123. See MAY, supra note 16, at 37.
124. Letter from James Madison to Simon Snyder (April 13, 1809), in 1 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 114, 114 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds.,
1984). Note that this statement addresses only the Executive's power to refuse to carry
out a specific order of the court.
125. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Marbury is perhaps the most well-known
constitutional law decision. See Jamin B. Raskin, Is This America? The District of
Columbia and the Right to Vote, 34 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 39, 95 (1999).
126. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176-77; BICKEL, supra note 90, at 1.
127. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177-78; see BICKEL, supra note 90, at 3. Chief
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emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is. ' 12 In sum, Marbury does not preclude the executive
branch from interpreting the Constitution by giving that power
exclusively to the judiciary; rather, it merely stands for the
proposition that the judiciary must resolve constitutional issues in
order to resolve a case before it.129
More than 150 years after Marbury, the Supreme Court declared
in Cooper v. Aaron30 that its constitutional interpretation is to be
considered the "'supreme Law of the Land.' ,,3 Cooper expressly
supports not only the notion that the judiciary legitimately interprets
the Constitution in order to decide a case before it, but also the
notion that the Court has the power to establish constitutional norms
that bind all branches and governmental actors. If the Court's
interpretation is the "supreme Law of the Land," then it follows that
the executive branch must consider the Court's interpretation just as
binding as the Constitution itself. Commentators, however, have
responded to the Court's language in Cooper with harsh criticism.3
In United States v. Nixon,134 the Court cited Marbury to support
its conclusion that the Court is the "ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution."'35  Significantly, however, the Nixon Court also
recognized that each branch must "initially interpret the
Constitution" in carrying out its duties.'36 This recognition implies
Justice Marshall buttressed his conclusion in Marbury with the Oath Clause. He stated
that it would be immoral to impose the Oath Clause upon the judges "if they were to be
used as the instruments, and the knowing instruments, for violating what they swear to
support!" Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180.
128. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177-78.
129. See Rex Lee, The Province of Constitutional Interpretation, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1009,
1010 (1987).
130. 358 U.s. 1 (1958).
131. Id. at 24 ("Our kind of society cannot endure if the controlling authority of the
Law as derived from the Constitution is not to be the tribunal specially charged with the
duty of ascertaining and declaring what is 'the supreme Law of the Land.'" (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. VI, § 2).
132. Id at23-25.
133. See Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron
Revisited, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 388-89 & nn.8-19 (collecting scholarly criticism of the
dicta in Cooper).
134. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
135. Id. at 704.
136. Id. at 703. Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in Freytag v. Commissioner,
501 U.S. 868 (1991), recognizing the existence of the Executive's authority to refuse to
execute a law that he finds unconstitutional. See id. at 906 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment). The statement, however, was used to illustrate a point; it
was not a necessary component of Justice Scalia's analysis. See id. at 901 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Three Justices joined in the opinion,
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that while other branches engage in some form of constitutional
interpretation, the judiciary's interpretation, once made, is binding as
to matters the Court has resolved.
Davis v. United States37 also informs the inquiry into executive
constitutional interpretation. As noted earlier,'138 in Davis the
Government argued for admissibility of a confession based on
Miranda.'39 The Court noted that § 3501 would be applicable to the
decision, but chose to confine its decision to the arguments presented
by the parties."4 In response, Justice Scalia argued that the Justice
Department's stance on § 3501 should not matter.14' The statute
represents an instruction by Congress to the courts, according to
Justice Scalia, and the executive branch's failure to bring up the
statute should not force the courts to shirk their responsibility under
the statute. 42 Justice Scalia's opinion suggests that at least one
member of the Court would not recognize independent executive
power to interpret the Constitution, at least insofar as the
interpretation represents nonenforcement of a criminal procedure
statute.
Having discussed the Supreme Court cases with implications on
the task of identifying legitimate constitutional interpreters, a
discussion of the normative consequences of executive interpretation
is in order. Commentators dispute whether executive interpretation
would be normatively beneficial.43  Some critics of executive
interpretation emphasize arguments involving the settlement function
which stands as a reminder that there continues to be a debate within the judiciary
regarding autonomous executive interpretation. See id at 892 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
137. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
138. See supra notes 39-44, 51-55 (discussing both the Dickerson majority's and
dissent's reading of Davis).
139. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 457 n.*.
140. See id.
141. See iti at 464-65 (Scalia, J., concurring).
142. See id. at 465 (Scalia, J., concurring).
143. See Peabody, supra note 59, at 64 (stating that the assertion of executive
interpretive autonomy has "provoked something of a normative backlash"). Professors
Alexander and Schauer, for example, argue that the consequences of recognizing
expansive executive interpretive autonomy would be negative. See Alexander & Schauer,
supra note 74, at 1362 (stating their acceptance of judicial supremacy without qualification
based on normative grounds). Professor Merrill, on the other hand, makes the argument
that the consequences of executive interpretive autonomy can be seen as normatively
beneficial. See Merrill, supra note 74, at 70-79; see also Easterbrook, supra note 62, at 918
(arguing that a unitary executive branch provides more consistent interpretation than an
unorganized, hydra-headed judiciary). Professors Alexander and Schauer go so far as to
assert that normative issues deserve not merely more intensive discussion, but rather
"exclusive" attention in this debate. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 74, at 1370.
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of the law. An important function of the law is to decide
authoritatively the rules of society, allowing members of society to
adjust their behavior to conform to the law and avoid suffering the
consequences of breaking the rules.'" Critics argue that permitting
the executive branch to interpret the law would lead to uncertainty
and thus undermine the settlement function. 145 Because the law
would remain in a state of flux even after the Court speaks on an
issue, people would no longer be able to determine what the
Constitution meant from one situation to the next in a system
recognizing executive interpretation.
Consider the example of a rule on free speech. 46 Some critics of
executive interpretation argue that a suboptimal, but settled, rule
regarding freedom of speech is preferable to an optimal, but
unsettled, rule.14 7 This argument rests on the belief that unsettled law
likely deters constitutionally protected communication,'14  while
settled rules instill more confidence and thus have a liberating effect
on speech. 49 The need for such certainty is heightened by the fact
that there are often no single correct answers to important
constitutional questions. 50 Because many possible answers exist,
there may be a legitimate need for one branch to engage in
144. See, e.g., Alexander & Schauer, supra note 74, at 1371-82 (discussing the
settlement function of the law). According to this theory, if there were several branches
engaged in interpretation, there would not be one authoritative voice to tell the other
branches and the people the law. See id; see also Peabody, supra note 59, at 64 (stating
that the settlement-function argument is perhaps the predominant critique of executive
interpretive authority). This theory levels a serious charge because the law arguably
should "speak with a single voice." John Stick, He Doth Protest Too Much: Moderating
Meese's Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 61 TuL. L. REv. 1079, 1085-86 (1987).
145. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 12, at 1093 (contending that "[a]ny other rule would be
anarchy"); Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L.
REv. 707, 711-12 (1985) (arguing that too many constitutional interpreters would create
"a plethora of conflicting, shifting interpretations").
146. This example comes from Alexander & Schauer, supra note 74, at 1373.
147. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of
law be settled than that it be settled right"), overruled in part by Helvering v. Mountain
Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938), and in part by Helvering v. Backline Oil Co., 303
U.S. 362 (1938). Consider also the assertion that "we rely upon law to guide our 'primary'
pre-event behavior in the hope that we can order our everyday affairs so that undesirable
events will not occur at all." Burt Neuborne, The Binding Quality of Supreme Court
Precedent, 61 TutL. L. REv. 991, 995 (1987).
148. See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 74, at 1373.
149. See id. A strong argument exists that the settlement function is even more
important in the context of contract and property law. See id. at 1371.
150. See Neuborne, supra note 147, at 999 (referring to "the illusion of an objectively
knowable, ideal Constitution, which is equally subject to discovery by all comers").
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interpretation that is binding on all others.'5 ' Proponents of
autonomous executive interpretation respond to this criticism by
pointing out that there are literally thousands of judges, while there is
only one President.5 2 They argue that a single Executive does a
better job of avoiding chaos than a judiciary that speaks with many
voices. 53
Another argument in favor of binding judicial decisions rests on
principles of equity. If expansive executive interpretation was
recognized, the outcome of a claim brought in an administrative
setting might depend on the branch hearing it.Y Consider, for
example, the Reagan administration's policy of nonacquiescence to
circuit court interpretations of a federal social security statute.
During 1984, the Social Security Administration (SSA) denied
approximately 900,000 applications for benefits.5 5 In a very high
percentage of these cases, the lower federal courts reversed the SSA's
decision.'56 These cases illustrate the inequity that results from
allowing expansive executive interpretation: those applicants with
the resources and sophistication to seek redress from an executive
decision in the courts had greater rights than those without such
resources and sophistication.157  If the executive branch had
considered the judiciary's statutory construction binding, it is likely
that those who did not have the resources to seek judicial review
would have had the same outcome-receipt of benefits-as those
who sought redress in the courts.
Similarly, critics of autonomous executive interpretation argue
that certain institutional factors make the judiciary the preferred
branch to interpret the Constitution. First, the judiciary is perceived
to have unique expertise in constitutional interpretation.58  In
addition, the judiciary is not subject to the same degree of political
pressures as the other branches5 9 because of the effective insulation
provided by life tenure and compensation guarantees.'1° The actions
151. See id.
152. See Easterbrook, supra note 62, at 917-18.
153. See id. at 918.
154. See Neubome, supra note 147, at 996-97.
155. See id- at 996. While this case did not implicate constitutional interpretation, it
nonetheless provides a clear example of problems arising from executive interpretations
that differ from interpretations by the judiciary. In the case of the SSA, the executive
branch refused to acquiesce to the federal circuit courts' statutory interpretation.
156. See id-
157. See i
158. See Easterbrook, supra note 62, at 916.
159. See Merrill, supra note 74, at 75.
160. See U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 1.
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of the executive branch, on the other hand, regularly are subject to
public rebuke through the election process. 161 These factors create a
comparatively favorable environment in which the judiciary can
interpret the Constitution in an unbiased and neutral manner. The
judiciary is therefore better able and more likely to protect unpopular
interests than are the representative branches. 6 In contrast, critics
argue, an Executive with expansive interpretive authority might
confuse her majoritarian political platform with the Constitution.63
Furthermore, the Executive could become too powerful under a
system with expansive executive interpretation; 164 by ignoring judicial
interpretations, the Executive could realign the power structure built
upon the notion of checks and balances, including judicial review.65
Proponents of autonomous executive interpretation posit that
interpretive accuracy will not decrease in a system that recognizes
executive interpretation. First, they argue, executive participation in
the process would create a more adversarial environment in which the
Constitution is interpreted.'6 The judiciary would not have the
authority to settle questions of interpretation. 67 Thus, the branches
would be forced to interact in a more consultative, interactive style,
because they all would have a say in defining what the Constitution
means.16 Consequently, the accuracy of interpretation would
improve in much the same way that the accuracy of judicial decisions
is thought to improve under the adversarial method. 69 Second,
proponents assert that the executive branch, like the judiciary, has a
high level of expertise in interpretation; the executive offices of the
Attorney General, Legal Counsel, and Solicitor General have all
been staffed with many former and soon-to-be federal judges and
Justices.'Y
Proponents also describe judges as an institutional, unelected
161. See Rosenfeld, supra note 60, at 148 (noting the short terms of the President and
members of Congress compared to the life terms of judges).
162. See id at 159-67 (discussing this argument as it relates to executive
interpretation).
163. Cf. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 74, at 1368 ("Congress has its own views
about constitutional interpretation, views that conveniently produce outcomes routinely
congruent with Congress's own policy views.").
164. See Merrill, supra note 74, at 71 (arguing that the most expansive forms of
executive interpretive autonomy would result in an overly powerful executive branch).
165. See id
166. See id. at 45.
167. See id. at 75-76.
168. See id. at 76.
169. See id.
170. See Easterbrook, supra note 62, at 916-17.
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elite whose insulation renders them unaccountable to the public,171
arguing that it is better to grant at least some interpretive power to
those who are elected and thus mindful of the people's wishes.
72
Proponents also point out that the judiciary can and does
underenforce constitutional norms." Judicial supremacy may thus
produce a disincentive to the other branches to interpret the
Constitution and to enforce those norms that are underenforced by
the judiciary.174
The proponents of autonomous executive interpretation assert
that if more branches are engaged in interpretation, the likelihood of
tyranny decreases.175 Conflict will enhance protections against an
overbearing government,' 6 as three branches instead of just one will
have to decide that a law is constitutional before it goes into effect.
77
Additionally, the mere presence of executive interpretation will
improve judicial interpretation, as the judiciary will take a more
egalitarian approach to interpretation, seeking out the views of other
branches in reaching critical decisions. 78 Finally, there are many
effective checks against executive usurpation of power even if we
recognize expansive executive interpretation.7 9 These checks include
Congress's power of impeachment, power of the purse, and power to
use necessary and proper means to carry out its will.'
171. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Could Meese Be Right This Time?, 61 TUL. L. REV.
1071, 1078 (1987) (arguing that judicial supremacy "further legitimizes government by
legally trained elites speaking an evermore esoteric language").
172. See Merrill, supra note 74, at 75 (stating that under a system recognizing executive
interpretive autonomy, the courts would have to be mindful of those views held by the
people as represented by the politically accountable branches).
173. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. Rnv. 1212,1213 (1978).
174. See Merrill, supra note 74, at 77 ("Of particular concern here is the willingness of
Congress and the executive to take responsibility for enforcing the Constitution,
particularly those provisions that may be 'underenforced' because of justiciability or other
limits on judicial action.").
175. See Paulsen, supra note 19, at 330.
176. See id.
177. For a hypothetical illustration, see Easterbrook, supra note 62, at 922-24.
178. See Merrill, supra note 74, at 75 (stating that independent executive interpretation
will lead courts to "view interpretation in more egalitarian terms, seeking not blind
obedience but 'interactive conciliation' with the other branches").
179. See Paulsen, supra note 19, at 324.
180. See id. Professor Paulsen recognizes that such checks are blunt instruments, but
asserts that they lead to compromise and moderation. See id. If exercised to their full
potential, the branches' checks over each other could lead to political meltdown, but
Professor Paulsen asserts that the deterrence that such a scenario creates is comparable to
the doctrine of mutual assured destruction in the national security arena. See id. In other
words, no branch is likely to exercise its powers to the fullest extent because all branches
would suffer. See id.
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This Note engages in a bifurcated analysis of the foregoing
material.'8' The first portion analyzes whether autonomous executive
interpretation is coherent within our constitutional system."w This
coherence inquiry concentrates on the Constitution's text,18 the
Framers' intent,"M Supreme Court precedent," and historical acts by
the executive branch.186 This inquiry is a general one and does not
specifically address the Dickerson court's treatment of executive
interpretation; it only asks whether autonomous executive
interpretation in its various forms is consistent with the factors named
above. The second portion of the analysis examines the normative
consequences of recognizing an executive power to interpret the
Constitution autonomously.'7 This inquiry concentrates primarily on
whether the recognition of such a power had positive or negative
consequences in the context of Dickerson-that is, whether it would
have been normatively better for the court to recognize the
executive's power of autonomous interpretation.
The text of the Constitution is not clear on its face as to the
question of executive interpretation.'8 The Executive Oath Clause,
for instance, instructs the President to uphold the Constitution. 189
Although the Clause raises questions regarding constitutional
interpretation, it does not provide the answer. 9 It legitimately may
be read either to require the executive branch to defer to another
branch's constitutional interpretation or to interpret the Constitution
181. In doing so, this Note consciously utilizes a framework proposed by Professor
Merrill. See Merrill, supra note 74, at 60 (setting forth his intention to engage in a
coherentist and consequentialist inquiry); id. at 60-70 (discussing the "[c]oherentist
[c]onsiderations" to take into account in deciding whether judicial decisions should bind
all executive decisions); id. at 70-78 (discussing the "[c]onsequentialist [c]onsiderations" to
take into account in deciding whether judicial decisions should bind all executive
decisions). In the consequentialist inquiry, this Note further adopts Professor Rosenfeld's
suggestion, taking into account the substantive, institutional, and contextual factors. See
Rosenfeld, supra note 60, at 167.
182. See infra notes 188-277 and accompanying text.
183. See infra notes 188-242 and accompanying text.
184. See infra notes 197-213 and accompanying text.
185. See infra notes 214-36 and accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 237-42 and accompanying text.
187. See infra notes 243-77 and accompanying text.
188. See Merrill, supra note 74, at 58 (stating that the "allocation of power must be
resolved by means other than an analysis of the constitutional text"); Rosenfeld, supra
note 60, at 137 (stating that the text is "remarkably silent").
189. See U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 8; see also supra notes 86-96 and accompanying text
(discussing the Executive Oath and Judicial Oath Clauses).
190. See Strauss, supra note 12, at 121 ("This argument is question-begging.... An




itself. 9' Similarly, the Take Care Clause may be read consistently
with either expansive executive interpretation or with judicial
supremacy.' 92 Although the Clause instructs the Executive to "take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,"'93 this language does not
define what the "law" is.' 94 It is plausible that the judiciary's opinions
are "law."' 95 Thus, the executive branch would be bound to execute
the law as defined by the judiciary. It is also plausible, however, that
"law" refers only to the Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties.96
As the text does not provide a clear explanation, we must look
elsewhere to decide when executive interpretive authority exists.
When analyzing the arguments about the intent of the Framers,
both critics and proponents of executive interpretation confront the
generality of the Framers' statements.Y97 The statements-as well as
accepted notions of checks and balances and the separation of
powers---can be used to support and to criticize autonomous
executive interpretation.9 8 For example, the Framers certainly were
committed to some form of coordinacy,199 but it is possible that they
intended coordinacy to manifest itself in the universally recognized
forms of legitimate executive interpretation, such as the pardon and
veto powers. 0 The Framers made few statements directly addressing
191. See id. at 121-22.
192. See Merrill, supra note 74, at 54 & n.50.
193. U.S. CONST. art. H, § 3.
194. See Merrill, supra note 74, at 53-54 & n.50 (stating that the Take Care Clause
"simply begs the question" whether the law includes the judiciary's understanding of the
law as expressed in judicial opinions).
195. See idL at 54.
196. See id. at 54 & n.50. As Professor Merrill notes, such a reading is certainly
plausible if one compares the parallel use of "Laws" in the Take Care Clause, U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 3, to the use of "Laws ... made in Pursuance thereof," U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
See Merrill, supra note 74, at 54 n.50. Professor Merrill believes that "[t]he framers would
not have regarded judicial doctrine as 'made' in this sense." Id.
197. See, e.g., MAY, supra note 16, at 34. Professor May challenges Paulsen's assertion
that the logical extensions of coordinacy necessarily include a President's authority to
refuse to execute unconstitutional laws. See id. May posits that the Framers' endorsement
of executive interpretation in some instances does not answer "the critical question ... [of]
whether this interpretive authority extends to refusing to enforce the laws." Id.
198. Professor Paulsen, for example, refers to the intent of the Framers as expressed in
The Federalist Papers to support the notion of coordinacy. See Paulsen, supra note 19, at
221. He then argues that expansive executive interpretive authority logically must extend
from this notion. See id. On the other hand, Professor May attempts to discern the
Framers' intent as to executive nonexecution of statutes by examining their statements
about other executive powers. See MAY, supra note 16, at 11-26.
199. See supra notes 101-17 and accompanying text (discussing the Framers' notion of
coordinacy).
200. See MAY, supra note 16, at 11-15, 21-23 (contending that the existence of the veto
and pardon powers, as adopted, strengthen the argument against executive nonexecution
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the issue, and even those statements are in conflict.2 1 For example,
James Wilson's direct statement that recognized the Executive's
authority to refuse to execute a statute2° can be contrasted with
James Madison's statement that the judiciary is the only branch that
can declare a statute void as unconstitutional. 3
On balance, however, it seems clear that the Framers intended to
create some measure of autonomous executive interpretation.2
First, the argument that the Framers were wary of something
analogous to the royal prerogative and, thus, soundly rejected
executive review is not compelling. 25 The Framers appeared to
consider nonexecution to be legitimate only when the Executive
believes that a statute is unconstitutional. 6 The royal prerogative
was onerous in part because there was no such limitation on the
of statutes).
201. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing James Wilson's statement
directly supporting executive nonenforcement of a statute that the President believes to be
unconstitutional); supra note 121 and accompanying text (discussing Hamilton's statement
that the judiciary is the only department that can determine that a law is void because it is
also unconstitutional); supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing Jefferson's direct
statement that the veto was the manner in which an Executive could ward off an
unconstitutional statute); supra note 124 (discussing Madison's statement that he, as
President, did not have the authority to refuse the execution of a law).
202. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. Jefferson's statement that the veto
power is the Executive's shield against unconstitutional laws is less persuasive because it
was made after the Constitution was ratified and may have reflected Jefferson's opposition
to legislation creating a national bank, which he was encouraging President Washington to
veto. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. Madison's statement, made while he was
serving as President, similarly may have reflected political expediency rather than his
opinion on executive interpretation. He was effectively keeping himself out of the
political thicket surrounding the Olmstead Affair. See Paulsen, supra note 19, at 308-11.
204. See Rosenfeld, supra note 60, at 138 ("Indeed, practice, tradition, and institutional
constraints have combined to produce widespread acceptance of a pattern of allocation of
powers of constitutional interpretation between the executive and judicial branches.").
205. See Beck, supra note 76, at 423-24 (discussing the flaws in such an argument). See
generally supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text (discussing the argument that
problems created by Britain's royal prerogative influenced the Framers to reject a
presidential prerogative).
206. See Beck, supra note 76, at 423-24. Professor May counters that, "[w]ith a little
imagination, almost any policy disagreement can be couched in constitutional terms."
MAY, supra note 16, at 137. This statement, however, merely stresses the fact that the
executive branch has the power to underenforce a provision and may justify its action by
calling the provision unconstitutional. See id at 137. Professor May's study lends support
to the notion that the executive branch has the power to underenforce. See id. at 127-29
& tbl.9.1. This Note, however, discusses a distinct issue: whether the executive branch
may legitimately exercise this power. Thus, Professor Beck's inclusion of the requirement
that executive branch members believe a statute is unconstitutional is important. See




Second, the assertion that the Framers intended judicial
supremacy rests on shaky ground.2"8 Judicial review is a lesser power
than interpretive supremacy-judicial review allows the judiciary to
strike down a law it finds unconstitutional in a particular case while
interpretive supremacy would give the judiciary the power to
authoritatively establish constitutional norms that must be applied in
all similar cases. The Constitution does not expressly recognize the
power of judicial review,209 and such review has been somewhat
controversial.210 Interpreting the Constitution to support judicial
supremacy is even more tenuous. If the executive branch were
obligated to follow the judiciary's interpretation of the Constitution
without qualification, the judiciary would no longer be the "least"
dangerous branch.21' It would have the power to define the rules of
government for all branches-its judgments would be beyond review
and its actions beyond check 12 In light of these concerns, executive
interpretation is consistent with a coordinate system because it checks
the judiciary, barring that branch from authoritatively "settling the
boundaries" of the various branches' powers.' 3
In analyzing the Supreme Court's precedent in the area of
constitutional interpretation, one must keep in mind that the Court is
an interested party because its power is at stake.214 For example, if
completely autonomous executive review were recognized as
legitimate in all forms, the Court's power would decrease
dramatically.215 Judicial decisions would carry only moral force, and
207. See Beck, supra note 76, at 423-24.
208. Consider, for example, the scholarly reaction to the Supreme Court's claim of
judicial supremacy in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). See infra notes 221-24 and
accompanying text.
209. See BICKEL, supra note 90, at 1 ("[T]he institution of the judiciary needed to be
summoned up out of the constitutional vapors, shaped, and maintained .... ).
210. See id. at 14, 15 (stating that Marbury "met with controversy, to be sure, which has
also recurred sporadically since it was decided," and that the decision "has been attacked,
not merely for its apparent frailties, but as an act of usurpation" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
211. See Paulsen, supra note 19, at 251-52.
212. See id. at 252 ("If the judiciary [were supreme in constitutional interpretation],
then the judiciary would not be weak (as Hamilton claimed), but very, very powerful. Its
judgments, including its assertions of jurisdiction, would be beyond any check." (citations
omitted)).
213. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, supra note 102, at 257.
214. See Merrill, supra note 74, at 53 (pointing out that when the scope of the branches'
respective powers is at issue, one branch cannot decide the issue simply by invoking its
own authority).
215. See id. at 71.
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the executive branch would not be bound by the judiciary's
interpretations, even in the context of a specific adjudicated case.216
The following section reviews four cases, examining the Court's
statements on the issue of interpretive authority, the first and most
important of which is Marbury.
It is well settled that Marbury established the legitimacy of
judicial review. Significantly, however, Marbury did not establish the
concept of judicial supremacy. 217 The reasoning that Chief Justice
Marshall employed to establish judicial review has even been used to
argue for the legitimacy of executive interpretive autonomy.218 Chief
Justice Marshall reasoned that Congress may not authoritatively
determine whether its legislation is constitutional because such a
determination would be inconsistent with limited powers.219
Similarly, granting the judiciary interpretive supremacy would give
that branch the authority to determine the scope of its own powers,
which runs contrary to a federal government of limited powers.z2 0
The Court's next strong statement about its interpretive
supremacy came in Cooper, which met with severe criticism 21
Indeed, Cooper is considered by most commentators to be plainly
wrong insofar as it purports to establish exclusive interpretive power
in the judiciary.m Perhaps, then, the Court's dictum in that case
should not be read so literally.3 Exigent circumstances in the case
called for an emphatic statement of judicial strength by the Court, 4
and later opinions have not repeated Cooper's assertion.
216. See id. ("If the executive could sit in review of judicial judgments, we would ....
have in effect a two-branch system, with the executive serving as both prosecutor and
court of last resort.").
217. See Lee, supra note 129, at 1010; Merrill, supra note 74, at 51; Paulsen, supra note
19, at 241-62.
218. See Beck, supra note 76, at 421 (stating that "one standard argument for
presidential review tracks the justification for judicial review offered in Marbury v.
Madison").
219. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803); supra notes 126-27
and accompanying text.
220. See Beck, supra note 76, at 422.
221. See Farber, supra note 133, at 388-89 & nn.8-19 (collecting scholarly criticism of
the dicta in Cooper).
222. See id.; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUI.ONAL LAW § 3-4
(2d ed. 1998) (discussing Cooper's dicta).
223. See TRIBE, supra note 222, § 3-4, at 35 (stating that Cooper "does not require so
literal a reading of its invocation of absolute judicial supremacy").
224. See id. § 3-4. In Cooper, the Governor of Arkansas refused to execute an order by
the United States Supreme Court to desegregate schools in the state's capital, Little Rock.
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). The Court's authority to render decisions in the
context of a specific case binding on state officials was therefore at stake. See id.
225. See TRIBE, supra note 222, § 3-4, at 33 ("[S]ubsequent assertions of [the Court's]
1180 [Vol. 78
EXECUTIVE INTERPRETATION
Although the Court identified itself as the " 'ultimate interpreter
of the Constitution' " in United States v. Nixon 22 the most
appropriate way to read that declaration is that the Court is the last
branch to interpret the Constitution in the context of a specific case.227
Few scholars would object to such a claim because it simply reiterates
the accepted notion that the executive branch must obey a judicial
order as it relates to a specific case.32 If the Court meant that it had
the last word on a constitutional issue in general, then the claim
would be indistinguishable from the one made in Cooper and would
be subject to the same criticisms. 2 9 The former reading of the Court's
language is more appropriate.230
Finally, Justice Scalia's remarks in Davis shed light on the
judiciary's duty to enforce § 3501.31 Justice Scalia made a troubling
argument that the DOJ has the power, "whether or not it has the
right," to avoid application of the statute by declining to introduce
evidence of confessions obtained in violation of Miranda at trial.2
The practical consequences of this assertion seem problematic,
however. Justice Scalia's argument imagines a scenario in which the
executive branch could still afford defendants an approximation of
their Miranda rights even if the Court overruled Miranda. In other
words, the prosecution could make an internal Miranda
determination. If the prosecution found a confession admissible
ultimate authority have tended to be more restrained .... ).
226. 418 U.S. 683,704 (1974) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369U.S. 186,211 (1962)).
227. Even Professor Paulsen, a proponent of very expansive executive interpretive
autonomy, concedes that James Madison, from whom Paulsen finds great support for the
notion of coordinacy, concluded that "judicial decisions in particular cases would, as a
practical and descriptive matter, constitute the 'final' resolution of the issue, at least for
that particular case." Paulsen, supra note 19, at 235-36.
228. See id. at 226 (stating Paulsen's belief that his theory is unique in its endorsement
of the President's power to ignore a specific judgment by the Court).
229. See supra notes 221-25 and accompanying text (discussing the academic criticism
of Cooper). This criticism has centered on the assertion that the Court's constitutional
interpretation "is itself the 'supreme law of the land,'" which is inconsistent with the
notion "that the Court ... simply resolves the claims of the parties before it." TRIBE,
supra note 222, § 3-4, at 34 (quoting Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1,18 (1958)).
230. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703. President Nixon claimed that the executive branch's
interpretation in the context of the case at hand was authoritative.
231. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452,464-65 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).
232. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia's statement is strikingly different than his
statement in Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 906 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment). His language in Davis seems to imply doubt as to
the executive branch's authority to refuse to enforce a statute. Davis, 512 U.S. at 464-65
(Scalia, J., concurring). In Freytag, he stated in dicta that executive officials may indeed
refuse such enforcement. See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 906 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
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under Miranda, it would offer the confession into evidence. If, on the
other hand, the prosecution decided that the confession was
inadmissible under Miranda, it would not offer evidence of the
confession.
While it is intuitively appealing, there is a practical problem with
this scenario. The DOJ's internal process of deciding admissibility
under Miranda would not benefit from the adversarial process. 23
First, the prosecutor would act as the adjudicatory body in making the
DOJ's internal Miranda determination, thereby displacing the
adversarial process.23 Second, neither party would argue for
admissibility under § 3501 if a defendant challenged the admission of
his confession in a court proceeding. We could expect the DOJ to
argue only that the Miranda requirements were met in obtaining the
confession. Miranda is only one factor to be considered under § 3501,
however. Hence, a judge making a decision about admissibility under
§ 3501 would not benefit from an argument by either of the parties in
front of the bench. Confidence in the accuracy of admissibility
determinations would thus decrease due to the absence of the
adversarial process 35
In addition to the practical problems presented by Justice
Scalia's implication, the majority opinion in Davis is inconsistent with
Justice Scalia's assertion that the judiciary has a duty to enforce
§ 3501. The Davis Court did not decide § 3501's constitutionality in
part because the DOJ did not argue it.36 If the Court considered the
233. See Jay Sterling Silver, Equality of Arms and the Adversarial Process: A New
Constitutional Right, 1990 WIS. L. Rv. 1007, 1009 n.7 (1990) (stating that "the adversarial
process is a means of optimizing the search for truth"). The adversarial process
theoretically improves the accuracy of the decisionmaking process by: (1) engaging an
independent decision-maker; (2) hearing zealous arguments on both sides of the issue at
hand; and (3) weighing the arguments to determine which argument is stronger or better
supported. See Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERIcAN LAW 30,
30-31 (H. Berman ed., 1961). The foregoing does not suggest that the adversarial process
is essential to a Miranda determination, but simply that it is a key factor in establishing
confidence in the accuracy of the determination.
234. The net effect, however, may be closer to a § 3501 result than is initially apparent.
One commentator argues that individual prosecutors often overreach DOJ policy. See
Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469,
486-88 (1996) (discussing prosecutorial overreaching). If it is true that such overreaching
occurs, the implication is that the prosecutor is more likely to find confessions admissible
under Miranda than a court is. The current protections enjoyed by defendants under
Miranda would accordingly decrease. Section 3501 produces a similar diminution in
protections to the defendant. Depending on the degree to which Kahan's assertion about
overreaching is correct, the net effect of Justice Scalia's suggestion that § 3501 is a rule for
the courts may approximate a scenario in which the DOJ enforced the statute.
235. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
236. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 457 n.*.
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statute's enforcement to be its responsibility, the DOJ's refusal to
argue § 3501 would have had little impact on the Court's decision
regarding the proper standard for confession admissibility. The
Court's consideration of the DOJ's position thus implied that the
Court viewed the enforcement of § 3501 to be the responsibility of the
DOJ.
Like the judiciary, the executive branch is an interested party in
determining which branches may legitimately engage in constitutional
interpretation. 7  In no uncertain terms, the executive branch has
claimed a degree of interpretive autonomyY 8  One commentator
points out that the executive branch has claimed interpretive
autonomy relatively recently and asserts that this history should not
be relied upon to determine the Framers' intent.239 Nevertheless,
executive actions and statements are important because they may be
treated as a "gloss on 'executive Power.' "240 There are at least twenty
instances of executive nonexecution of statutes, beginning as early as
1860.241 The consistency and longevity of this practice make the
Executive's assertion of some level of executive interpretive
autonomy part of the political landscape.2 42
Although the issue of executive interpretation gives rise to
numerous questions, this Note focuses on a narrow issue24 3 -the
237. See Merrill, supra note 74, at 53.
238. With respect to nonexecution of a statute, see MAY, supra note 16, at xiii
("American presidents have with growing frequency claimed that they have the power
simply to ignore any law that, in their view, is unconstitutional.").
239. See i& at 130 (stating that the executive branch's nonenforcement of statutes on
constitutional grounds is too recent a development to help discern the intent of the
Framers).
240. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued
to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned ... may be treated as a
gloss on 'executive Power' vested in the President .... "). While Congress does not
acquiesce in some forms of executive interpretive autonomy (nonexecution of a recently
enacted statute, for example), Justice Frankfurter's language certainly points out the fact
that a branch's longstanding practices bear on the legitimacy of those practices.
Furthermore, it could be argued that Congress has acquiesced in the nonexecution of the
statute at issue in Dickerson; Congress has not challenged the DOJ's refusal to enforce
§ 3501 in the thirty years since it was enacted. See Miller, supra note 16, at 1029.
241. See MAY, supra note 16, at 127.
242. See Paulsen, supra note 19, at 268 ("The practice of nonexecution of assertedly
unlawful statutes has a long history."); cf. MAY, supra note 16, at xiii ("From 1974
through 1996, a period of barely twenty years, Presidents Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, and
Clinton signed but objected to the constitutionality of approximately 250 laws." (footnote
omitted)). But see MAY, supra note 16, at 131 (stating that the instances of executive
nonenforcement of statutes "have simply been too few and far between" to be of
relevance in determining whether this practice represents a gloss on executive power).
243. The normative issues surrounding all forms of executive interpretive authority are
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consequences arising from the recognition of an executive power to
underenforce legislation that affects a criminal case on constitutional
grounds when such underenforcement enhances a criminal
defendant's procedural protections. Although critics have charged
that executive interpretation upsets the settlement function,244 this
issue does not appear to be a problem within the specific context of
Dickerson. For example, consider what would have happened in
Dickerson if the Fourth Circuit had recognized an executive power to
underenforce § 3501. Because neither party addressed § 3501 on
appeal,2 45 the Fourth Circuit never would have considered the issue,
absent a change in the DOJ's position. Because the DOJ would have
been the only branch to express an opinion on the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment, there would have been no danger of upsetting the
law's settlement function.
In contrast, the result of the court's decision not to recognize a
power of underenforcement created a very different scenario. The
Fourth Circuit has ruled that § 3501 is constitutional, 246 while the
executive branch made clear its position that it considers the statute
unconstitutional.2 47 In effect, two separate governmental branches
have provided different interpretations of what protection the Fifth
Amendment affords. Thus, the Fourth Circuit's decision does upset
the state of the law and disregards the settlement function.241 This
result is not anomalous. The courts generally upset the settlement
function by deciding to rule upon the constitutionality of a criminal
procedure statute that the executive branch has chosen to
underenforce on constitutional grounds.249
worthy of intense debate among scholars. An analysis of the issue as raised in Dickerson,
though, need only look in detail at a very small portion of this argument.
244. See supra notes 144-53 and accompanying text (discussing the settlement function
of the law).
245. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 680 & n.14.
246. See id. at 692.
247. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
248. Although the judiciary upset the settlement function of the law, this Note does not
mean to imply that the executive branch's nonenforcement of the statute is congruent with
the settlement function. Congress, in passing the statute, communicated its view of the
Fifth Amendment. The executive branch, by not enforcing the statute on constitutional
grounds, communicated a different view of the amendment's meaning. Accordingly, the
executive branch upset the settlement function of the law. The text above only indicates
that the court's refusal to recognize the legitimacy of executive nonenforcement further
upsets the settlement function. Before Dickerson, for thirty years the people had been
exposed to only one authoritative standard-Miranda-for the admissibility of
confessions. Since Dickerson, however, the law is again unsettled.
249. We can assume that the same situation plays itself out in every case in which the
executive branch underenforces a criminal procedure statute and thereby grants more
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The equity criticisms raised against executive interpretatione0
also do not appear to be problematic within the context of Dickerson.
Unlike administrative cases-in which the outcomes may differ
depending on whether constitutional interpretation is performed by
an administrative agency or a judicial court-criminal adjudications
are handled solely by the courts321 The executive branch's threshold
decision not to enforce a law that it considers to be unconstitutional
would provide all defendants with a heightened level of protection
without regard to whether the defendants have the resources or
sophistication to appeal the executive determination.
In addition, institutional factors weigh in favor of the recognition
of an executive power to enhance the procedural protections given a
criminal defendant through the underenforcement of legislation. In
general, it is unclear whether a judicial claim of expertise in
interpretation is valid? 2 Likewise, the specific argument that the
judiciary has more expertise in interpreting the Constitutione 3 is not
compelling in the case of Dickerson. In the specific context of
criminal procedure, the executive branch arguably has more
interpretive expertise than the judiciary. . 4 The executive branch's
expertise stems from its more intimate knowledge of situations in
which Fifth Amendment violations can and do occur.255 The DOJ's
instrumentalities are involved with all stages of the criminal justice
system 6 and in many times the number of cases heard by the district
protection to the defendant than is required by the statute. The executive branch would
not argue its case under the statute-nor would the defendant. If the court gets involved,
however, there will be cacophonous messages about the meaning of the Constitution.
250. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text (discussing the equity concerns
raised by executive interpretive autonomy).
251. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
252. See Easterbrook, supra note 62, at 916 ("[I]f expertise is important it parades
down the halls of the executive branch.").
253. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
254. The argument that the executive branch has more interpretive expertise in this
area is not contrary to the previous assertion that the judiciary's determinations in
Miranda hearings are preferable to a hypothesized determination within the various
federal prosecutors' offices. See supra notes 231-35. That assertion rests on the
assumption that a prosecutor has an intense interest in a specific case, desires a certain
outcome, and will interpret the U.S. Constitution to dovetail with the outcome she desires.
Prosecutors' intense interest in specific cases has little significance in analyzing the DOJ's
ability to interpret the Constitution in the criminal procedure arena, however, because the
Justice Department supervises federal prosecutors rather than prosecuting criminal
defendants directly.
255. See Kahan, supra note 234, at 489 (discussing the Justice Department's superior
position to interpret federal criminal law statutes).
256. See i&
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courts. 7 Additionally, the great degree of interpretive autonomy
already vested in the executive branch as to criminal procedure
issues' 51 points to the fact that executive officials are practiced in this
type of interpretation.
Arguments that the judiciary is in a better position to protect
politically unpopular interests?59 are also unpersuasive in this context.
Executive nonenforcement of § 3501 has allowed the executive
branch to afford an added protection to the people.260 It is significant
that the Framers found the right against self-incrimination so
fundamental that it was included in the Bill of Rights.261 Miranda
protects a suspect's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
Congress has seen fit to take away some of that protection by passing
§ 3501, and the Fourth Circuit in Dickerson held that Congress had
the authority to do so.262 Under a system recognizing executive
interpretive autonomy, however, taking away the Miranda
protections would require agreement among all three branches.263 By
underenforcing § 3501, then, the executive branch is doing that which
commentators have applauded the judiciary for doing: protecting
unpopular interests. Normatively, this protection should be viewed as
257. See id at 495 & n.139. Although many federal suspects are investigated but never
charged, more than 75% of those charged plead guilty or no contest. See id While the
DOJ or its instrumentalities are involved in the cases in which defendants plead guilty or
no contest, the court system has only minimal contact with such cases. See id.
258. Federal prosecutors have a significant degree of delegated lawmaking authority.
See id. at 479-81.
259. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text (quoting the Framers' assertion
that an accumulation of powers would produce a tyrannical government). The executive
branch is, after all, attempting to grant protections equal to those granted by the Court in
Miranda. In Miranda, the Court recognized that it was dealing with "questions which go
to the roots of our concepts of American criminal jurisprudence: the restraints society
must observe consistent with the Federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for
crime." 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1965). In affirming prior case law, the Court attached the
principles of Miranda and its predecessors to "basic rights that are enshrined in our
Constitution." Id. at 442. That Miranda affords greater protections to a suspect's Fifth
Amendment rights than § 3501 is indisputable. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying
text (highlighting the differences between Miranda and § 3501).
261. Professor Rosenfeld argues that the identification of a constitutional interpreter
should depend on the protections that the interpreter would afford certain "fundamental
rights that are universally acknowledged as being protected under the Constitution."
Rosenfeld, supra note 60, at 162. These rights would certainly include the right against
self-incrimination, which is specifically enumerated in the Constitution. See U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
262. Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 695.
263. Again, this effect dovetails with the Framers' fear of losing freedoms to a
tyrannical government. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 245-46 (James Madison) (Max
Beloff ed., 2d ed. 1987); see also supra note 177 (citing an illustrative example).
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beneficial and appropriate.2 4
The recognition of an executive power of underenforcement in
the criminal procedure context poses little risk that the Executive will
confuse the Constitution with her political platform.2" A politician's
promise to defend the rights of the criminally accused is generally not
politically popular with the voters--consider that the promise to get
tough on crime has been the politician's campaign mantra for years.2
Additionally, a recently published empirical study of executive
nonexecution of federal statutes supports this notion that the
executive branch is unlikely to refuse enforcement of a statute to
protect criminal defendants.267 The study finds that the executive
264. See Rosenfeld, supra note 60, at 157 (asserting that the identification of a
constitutional interpreter should depend on the protections that the interpreter would
afford certain fundamental rights). The Washington Legal Foundation, the conservative
non-profit organization that submitted the amicus brief relied on by the Fourth Circuit in
Dickerson, advocates victims' rights. See Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation and
Safe Streets Coalition as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant United States at 1,
Dickerson v. United States, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999) (No. 97-4750), available in
<http://www.law.utah.edu/faculty/bios/cassell> (visited Mar. 31, 2000) (identifying the
foundation as a participant in litigation involving "criminal justice reform and the rights of
crime victims"). Protecting victims' rights may conflict with the notion that protecting
defendants' rights is a normatively beneficial practice. We can expect victims' rights to be
adequately protected via the political process. See infra notes 265-68 and accompanying
text (discussing the "tough on crime" stance politicians have taken in recent decades).
Majoritarian interests are therefore in less need of protection than those of a person
accused of a crime. That the Framers shared this opinion is implicit in the fact that the Bill
of Rights explicitly includes the right against self-incrimination. See U.S. CONST. amend.
V. Moreover, there is debate about whether Miranda has created the substantial negative
impact that its detractors predicted. Compare Cassell, supra note 11, at 438 (stating that
tentative calculations indicate that Miranda caused almost four percent of criminal
suspects to go free), with Schulhofer, supra note 11, at 547 (reviewing Cassell's empirical
data and concluding that the number of lost cases is close to zero). If indeed the social
costs are "[v]anishingly [s]mall," Schulhofer, supra note 11, at 500, then the rights of
victims are not affected to a great degree. To the degree that the argument that Miranda
has no negative impact is accurate, it bolsters the argument that the protection of the right
against self-incrimination should be viewed as normatively valuable.
265. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
266. See KATHERINE BECKETr, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS 3 (1997) ("Crime and punishment sit center stage
in the theater of American political discourse. For much of the past three decades,
politicians have made crime-related problems central campaign issues and struggled to
identify themselves as tougher than their competitors on crime, delinquency, and drug
use."); BRUCE J. COHEN, CRIME IN AMERICA, at vii (2d ed. 1977) ("For the past several
decades, the magnitude of the crime problem has been a prominent issue in every major
political campaign."); ELLIOTr CURRIE, CONFRONTING CRIME: AN AMERICAN
CHALLENGE 4 (1985) (discussing "ever-'tougher' policies against crime"); STUART A.
SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF LAW AND ORDER: STREET CRIME AND PUBLIC
POLICY, at xi (1984) ("Beginning in the mid-1960s, crime, especially street crime, became
a political issue of considerable importance at both the local and the national levels.").
267. See MAY, supra note 16, at 128-29.
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branch has never refused to enforce a criminal or criminal procedure
statute.m
Several peripheral concerns can be dealt with summarily. First,
no significant shift of power adheres to the executive branch if
nonenforcement is recognized as legitimate. The executive branch
possesses control over criminal justice enforcement.269 Executive
officials have the option of not prosecuting a crime in the first
place; 7° recognizing the ability to underenforce a criminal procedure
statute does little to disturb the current balance of power in the area
of criminal justice. Second, executive officials' self-interest is not a
concern27' because the interest being protected is not their own.272
Another normative reason to prefer recognition of the executive
branch's ability to provide criminal procedure protections involves
the possible underenforcement of constitutional norms by the
judiciary.273 Such judicial underenforcement should not preclude the
other branches from fully enforcing constitutional norms.274 It is
possible that Miranda rights are a constitutional requirement that the
Fourth Circuit has chosen not to protect. By refusing to recognize
executive authority to underenforce § 3501, the court may have
prevented the executive branch from fully protecting the
constitutional norms reflected in Miranda.
Whether recognizing an executive nonenforcement authority will
bring about other varied benefits is unclear. The possibility at least
exists that such recognition will: (1) influence the judiciary to take on
a more egalitarian persona;275 (2) improve the accuracy of
interpretation by creating a more consultative, interactive, and
268. See id This study obviously did not consider the Justice Department's
nonenforcement of § 3501.
269. See Kahan, supra note 234, at 479-81.
270. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 464-65 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("The Executive has the power ... to nullify some provisions of law by the mere failure to
prosecute-the exercise of so-called prosecutorial discretion.").
271. An exception to this assertion arises when a member of the executive branch is
being investigated. This Note ignores such a scenario, however, as it arises in only a small
percentage of criminal cases under investigation at any point in time.
272. As Miranda v. Arizona noted, "we deal with the admissibility of statements
obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation." 384 U.S.
436, 439 (1966). It is rarely the case that we expect a member of the executive branch to
be such an individual. See supra note 271.
273. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
274. See Sager, supra note 173, at 1221 ("[T]he legal powers or legal obligations of
government officials which are subtended in the unenforced margins or underenforced
constitutional norms are to be understood to remain in full force.").
275. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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adversarial environment among the branches;276 and (3) further the
settlement function by leaving some areas of interpretive authority in
a unitary executive instead of a hydra-headed judiciary.277 Even if
executive nonenforcement of criminal procedure statutes provided
none of these benefits, the balance still tips in favor of recognizing
nonenforcement because the other normative consequences discussed
above are advantageous.
In Dickerson, the Fourth Circuit overrode the executive branch's
view that § 3501 is unconstitutional, thus depriving executive officials
of their authority to interpret the Constitution. The court did this in
spite of the fact that the Framers' intent, the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence, historical understanding and practice, and normative
justifications all indicate that the executive branch should have the
authority to act as it did. In short, even if the judiciary does not give
Miranda a constitutional construction, it should allow the executive
branch to do so.
In conclusion, the Fourth Circuit's decision to address the
constitutional issue not raised by the DOJ or the defendant is
questionable. Executive interpretation is coherent in light of
constitutional text, the Framers' intent, judicial precedent, and past
executive branch actions. Additionally, and perhaps equally
importantly, autonomous executive interpretation has positive
consequences when the executive branch attempts to protect a
defendant's constitutional right against self-incrimination, as in
Dickerson. Dickerson petitioned for certiorari on the issue of the
propriety of the Fourth Circuit's review of Miranda's
constitutionality,278 but the Supreme Court granted certiorari only to
the question of whether § 3501 overrules Miranda.279 Whatever the
result of the Supreme Court's decision, the debate about autonomous
executive interpretation will continue. When the executive branch is
attempting to temper the tyranny of the many, as in Dickerson, it may
well be better to resolve this small part of the issue of independent
executive constitutional interpretation in favor of presidential review.
AARON PAUL ARNZEN
276. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
278. See Brief for the United States at *9, United States v. Dickerson, 2000 WL 141075
(No. 99-5525).
279. See Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 578, 578 (1999) (mem.) (granting
certiorari only to the § 3501-Miranda issue).
2000] 1189
